Abstract: As the incidence of child labor is highest among unskilled workers' families, there is a received wisdom that temporary emigration of this category of workers can solve the child labor problem in poor countries. In this paper, we suggest that the case for temporary emigration of unskilled workers as a solution to the child labor problem may be weak at best.
I. Introduction
In a seminal theoretical work on the child labor e ects of migrant remittances, Epstein and Kahana (2008) propose a mechanism whereby remittances sent by migrant parents enable not only their children, but also children living in non-migrant households, to stop working. Emigration, by reducing labor supply, causes wages to rise in the source country, which in turn enables even non-migrant households to dispense with child labor income.
While intuitively compelling, Epstein and Kahana's mechanism is perhaps impervious to the well-known fact that even in poor countries, unskilled labor may not be the only input in the economy-wide production process. For example, while low-tech agriculture may be intensive in unskilled labor, transportation, processing, shipping and handling of agricultural output, in contrast, may require skilled labor. At the sectoral level, therefore, the agriculture production function may exhibit complementarities between unskilled labor and skilled labor, as essential inputs. Furthermore, the above notwithstanding, their model's main prediction appears to be driven by their specification of parental utility function. This paper assesses the robustness of the main prediction of Epstein and Kahana (2008) .
We propose a mechanism whereby temporary emigration of unskilled workers can actually worsen, rather than solve, the child labor problem in poor countries. Central to this mechanism is the complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor, as well as the perfect substitutability between unskilled adult labor and child labor. On one hand, due to complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor, emigration of unskilled workers reduces the skilled labor wage through a decrease in the skilled labor's productivity level.
On the other hand, due to perfect substitutability between unskilled adult labor and child labor, emigration of unskilled workers raises the child labor wage. We show that emigration of unskilled workers thus tends to raise the incidence of child labor in families headed by skilled adults, while it has no e ect on the incidence of child labor in families headed by unskilled adults. The latter result is due to logarithmic preferences, which di er from the Stone-Geary specification used in Epstein and Kahana (2008) . As a result, instead of decreasing, the economy-wide incidence of child labor rises.
Our research contributes to the development literature on parental investment in child's human capital. Most contributions in this branch highlights the trade-o between the current benefits of child labor to poor households, and its future costs in terms of low levels of human capital for children, when they become adults. Basu and Van (1998 
II. Setup
Consider two overlapping-generations economies, North ( ) and South ( ). Both produce a unique tradable good. When it takes place within firms, production of the tradable good requires both skilled and unskilled labor. Only adults can supply skilled labor, while unskilled labor may be supplied by both adults and children. Unskilled adult workers make three important decisions: (i) whether or not to migrate to North ( ); (ii) depending on their location, how much money to transfer to their child dependent, (iii) how much child's time to allocate to skill-imparting education. Skilled adult, by contrast, are only concerned with the last two decisions, as they do not migrate.
Each child is endowed with one unit of time. Work and schooling are the only competing claims on child's time, with a fraction allocated to schooling and the remaining fraction 1 , to work.
When they emigrate, unskilled workers leave their children behind, and make international monetary transfers to their children. We refer to these transfers as remittances. We are interested in the impact these remittances have on the incidence of child labor in the source country of migrants.
Let be a binary variable representing the migration decision of an unskilled worker:
= if he migrates and = , if otherwise. Non-migrant workers supply their entire labor endowment to domestic firms in exchange for a wage if skilled, and if unskilled.
Unskilled migrant worker earn an exogenous wage¯ .
All workers have identical preferences over own-consumption , child's consumption , and the child's skilled status { } when adult. Assume a simple additively separable expected utility specification of these preferences:
where is the expectation operator, conditional on current-of-period information, 0 the altruism parameter, (0 1) the time-discounting factor, and ( ) the level of utility an adult worker derives from raising a child who transits to state { } when adult,
with 0.
Unskilled workers who make the migration decision allocate their income to the financing of own consumption, and remittance flows to their o spring. The budget constraint faced by an unskilled worker whose migration decision is { } thus is + e while the budget constraint faced by a skilled worker is + , where denotes the amount of money transferred to the child, the price of the tradable good at the place of employment , and
the labor income at the place of employment. Since children do not migrate, a child's consumption satisfies the following budget constraint: + (1 ) where the child labor wage, and 1 , child's time allocated to work.
Schooling is the only skill-accumulation mechanism. Skill accumulation is a stochastic process. There are two possible future states a child can transit to when adult. Each of these states denotes the skill status of the individual in it. A child whose parent is in state { } and works in country { } transits to state { } when adult with probability ( ) [0 1]. Skill accumulation thus leads to the following location-specific transition probability matrix:
We specialize these conditional probabilities to In South, firms are perfectly competitive in both the output and the input markets.
The production technology for the unique tradable good is a Cobb-Douglas function of skilled labor ( ), unskilled labor ( ) and child labor ( ):
where denotes a time-invariant exogenous measure of total factor productivity, which we take as a proxy of the level of development in the source country of emigrants, and , the denotes a measure of the economy-wide incidence of child labor.
Using (II.8) and (II.9), it can be shown that perfectly competitive hiring of labor leads to the following market-clearing wages in South
The wage e ects of emigration of unskilled workers can thus be seen through (II.12), (II.13), and (II.14). In particular, emigration of unskilled workers (i.e., a rise in ) raises the unskilled labor wage and the child labor wage, while it decreases the skilled labor wage.
A. Workers' Decision Problem
Workers in South are forward-looking. Their decision problems can thus be solved by applying a backward induction process. This process is structured as follows. First, as workers' utility is strictly increasing in all its arguments, in the optimum all budget constraints will be saturated. Therefore, using (II.1), (II.2), as well as budget constraints, we arrive at the following expected value function for an unskilled worker who makes decisions ¡ ¢ :
His decision problem takes the following form:
Unskilled workers choose their employment location by anticipating the consequences this choice will have on their children's skill-status when adult. Therefore, each unskilled worker first determines his child's education level and the intra-family remittance flow given his migration decision . Then, given ¡ ¢ , he optimally selects the employment location that yields the highest possible value. More formally, an unskilled worker's two stages problem is described as follows:
By contrast, since skilled workers do not emigrate to North, a skilled worker's decision problem is simply max ( )
Using (II.15), (II.5), (II.6), (II.12), (II.13) and (II.14) it can be checked that under Assumption 1, the first order necessary and su cient condition for an interior solution to the above decision problems lead to the following decision rules for unskilled workers:
if = For skilled workers, the first order conditions can be shown to lead to
With the above results, we next define the net gain from emigration for unskilled labor.
Let ( The equilibrium condition (II.26) implies that¯ = . Solving this equation yields the proposition below:
where
Observe that 1 is the supply of child labor in a family headed by an unskilled adult employed in location . Using the equilibrium condition¯ = . The reader can check from (II.20) and (II.22) that in equilibrium, the incidence of child labor in families headed by an unskilled adult is una ected by emigration:
Note that in absence of emigration (i.e., = 0), it can be shown using (II.11), (II.22), and (II.24) that the equilibrium incidence of child labor in South would be: 
III. Conclusion
This paper assessed the robustness of the main prediction of Epstein and Kahana (2008).
They suggest that child labor can be mitigated by encouraging temporary emigration of un-skilled workers. We show that alternative specifications of parental preferences and aggregate production function overturn this conclusion. We highlighted a mechanism whereby temporary emigration of unskilled workers worsens, rather than solves, the child labor problem in poor countries. Our analysis suggests that the case for temporary emigration of unskilled workers as a solution to the child labor problem may be weak at best.
